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The German Film Industry in the early stages of Nazi rule: consolidation and co-ordination

Introduction

The German Film Industry under the Nazis can be divided into three main phases. 1933-1937 saw the co-ordination and consolidation of the German Film Industry. 1937-1942 saw the further economic concentration and expansion of the industry as part of the war effort. 1942-1945 saw the nationalisation of the industry and its eventual destruction with the end of the war.[1]

Before 1933, Nazi involvement in the German Film Industry was insubstantial, consisting of amateurish productions only shown at National Socialist German Worker’s Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei or NSDAP) gatherings. The Party had little finance and experience in film production, but their contributions exemplify a rising appreciation of the value of film as a medium of propaganda.[2]

The importance of films for the new regime is clearly demonstrated in the swift and meticulous amalgamation of the film industry in 1933 and 1934. It was just one year after they came to power. It would see its culmination in the eventual nationalisation of the industry in 1942.

The NSDAP, an anti-democratic party who would rule by authoritarian means, understood the importance of winning German citizens over with the “battle for hearts and minds.”[3] Much of the film industry welcomed government intervention and new film policies. They were the first government to take an interest and get involved in helping the industry, with its plans for consolidation and better profitability.

As early as the 1920’s the National Socialists had infiltrated their members into many different spheres of public life. The entire organisation of the Party, the division into administrative sectors, the structure of leadership, were built up as a state within a state.[4] So, by the time they came to power, they were well prepared for the takeover of control of the film industry which, to a large extent “prepared itself to be controlled.” [5]

The following is an examination of the early Nazi German Film Industry, in the period that saw the consolidation (Festigung) and co-ordination (Gleichschaltung) of the industry in a radical manner. It is the period that paved the way for the eventual nationalisation of the industry in 1942.

It will begin with an examination of SPIO, the Reich Film Chamber, the Reich Culture Chamber, and the Film Credit Bank. Further analysis will outline the platform by which nationalisation began, namely the further economic development created by the RMVP through Max Winkler and Cautio. An analysis of censorship policies of the period will assign an understanding of the predicate system and the ban of film criticism as a means of developing film into the upmost artistic endeavour. All of the above will provide an insight into the basis by which the Nazis profoundly changed the economy and structure of the German Film Industry during the Third Reich.

 

Nazi consolidation of the German Film Industry

On the 30 of January 1933, President Hindenburg appointed Adolf Hitler Chancellor of Germany.  On the 11March 1933, Hitler’s cabinet established the Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda (Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda, RMVP or Propagandaministerium). The RMVP played a pivotal role in the German Film Industry until 1945. Much will be seen in the analysis that follows.

Headed by Reich Minister Joseph Goebbels, it was divided into six departments to include radio, press, propaganda, theatre, administration, and of course, film. It was tasked with the vague decree of being involved with “all tasks of spiritual direction of the nation”.[6]

The 1930’s saw the continuing effects of the World Trade recession and the advent of sounds films which meant total receipts from cinema had fallen significantly, while the cost of production had increased. Many film companies had gone bankrupt or were in considerable difficulties.  Even the larger German companies, like Ufa (Universum Film AG), were threatened. The new regime saw many radical solutions being put forward to help the film industry.

The Fighting League for German Culture (Kampfbund für deutsche Kulture) called for film industry centralisation and the banning of all films that offended the National Socialist World View (Völkische Weltanschauung). This was fundamentally against National Socialist ideology and Goebbels recognised that the film industry would not welcome sudden Nazi extremism. A more tolerant, discreet measure was needed to help the industry. Much of the measures introduced to the film industry were prepared largely behind the scenes, leaving many unaware of the growing state control of the industry. The prompt volume of complex laws and decrees put into place helped to prevent any non-compliance. Even the later nationalisation was done completely in secret, so as not to create public dissonance.

Alfred Hugenberg [7](owner of Ufa,) was now the Minister of Economics. In 1927 Hugenberg obtained a majority holding in Ufa (Universum Film AG), one of the largest film companies, buying out American interests. This was in response to the film crisis of the 1926-1927 period.

Hugenberg appointed one of his chief lieutenants, Ludwig Klitzsch, as managing director of Ufa to set about restructuring the company along the lines of Hollywood.[8] In 1927, Ludwig Klitzsch was also appointed president of the SPIO (Spitzenorganisation der Deutschen Filmindustrie), the industry’s main professional representative organisation.

The film industry crisis of the early 1930’s brought about a significant SPIO master plan, to help the film industry economy. Recovery measures focused around creating efficient relationships between the production, distribution and exhibition sectors of the industry.  Strategies comprised of the following:

  • The creation of a Ministry of Film
  • SPIO should be an administrative body with enhanced powers.
  • Production equipment should be made available only to those approved by SPIO.
  • The film industry should be rationalized.
  • A special film Industry bank should be created to act as a trust company to administer and safeguard conventional bank investments and loans. The bank would then approve the production schedule of films.

SPIO put the blame for the crisis of economy on the exhibitors, namely the German Cinema Owners’ Association (Reichs- verband Deutscher Lichtspieltheater e.V), accusing them of flooding the market with too many cinemas, price cutting cinema tickets and eating into the returns of the distributors and producers. Effectively, the plan would allow SPIO to regulate the entire production, distribution, and exhibition activity of the film industry.

The new regime ultimately followed much of the SPIO master plan. The first meeting of SPIO-Kommission was in June 1933 and brought together representatives of the industry and government to discuss the co-ordination of the entire industry. They came to many of the same conclusions as above. The first action was to order all firms to join SPIO if they wanted to continue working in the Film industry. This was facilitated through the establishment of the Reich Film Chamber. 

 

Reich Film Chamber

The law regarding the establishment of a Provisional Reich Film Chamber (Reichsfilmkammer/RFK) was announced on 14 July 1933. The Reich Film Chamber was the first chamber to be established by the new government, illustrating the immense importance that was placed on film as a propaganda tool, artistic medium, and economy of the Third Reich. This state body was created to:

 “…promote the German film branch within the framework of the overall economy, to represent the interests of the individual groups within the industry as well as in relation to the Reich, states, and communities.” [9]

The various sections of the industry were grouped into ten departments, each controlling all aspects of the industry. The RMVP appointed the RFK’s board of directors. Films were only allowed to be screened publicly if its cast and crew, racially ‘pure’ Germans, were members of the RFK. Non-membership effectively meant a ban of employment in the industry. So, the RFK was responsible at this early stage for the removal of Jews from the industry.

The president of the Film Chamber was Fritz Scheuermann, who, like Walter Funk (the secretary of the Propaganda Ministry) was one of the key link men between big business and the National Socialist government, and who had also been a member of the SPIO-Kommission.  The vice president was Arnold Raethar, who was also the deputy head of the Film department of the RVMP, and head of the Film Office of the Propaganda Office of the RVMP.  The advisory council were selected by Goebbels. They were members of the propaganda and finance ministries, and various major banks. It is difficult to avoid the fact that the roots of this chamber lay firmly in SPIO.

All of these leading positions helped Goebbels, and thus the government, to have a firm control over the industry from this early stage.

Reich Culture Chamber

The design of the RFK culminated with the establishment of the Reich Culture Chamber (Reichskulturkammer) on the 22 Sep 1933. The RFK was incorporated in the Culture Chamber, but hardly changed. It organised all German cultural activity within seven chambers- the provisional RFK, literature, theatre, music, fine arts, and radio. Its job was ‘furthering German culture and regulating economic and social aspects of cultural affairs.’[10]

A subordinated body to the RMVP, its president was Propaganda Minister Goebbels. Walter Funk was vice president. Hank Hinkel was appointed general secretary with the job of removing Jews from the industry.[11] Hinkel arranged for the Jews to have their own separate cultural organisation. This justified his total elimination of them from German cultural life. In May 1935 he was given overall responsibility for all matters relating to Reich Culture Chamber personnel policy.

 

Filmkreditbank

Film exports, especially to the United States, declined by 80 per cent when the Nazis came to power.[12]  Decline was primarily due to increasing hostility towards Germany. Many foreign Jewish distributors refused German films.

The Aryan Clause established on the 30th of June 1933, forbid Jews from working in the film industry. Many of the Jews in the industry had already left due to pressure from the Brown Shirts and the censorship instituted by the Propaganda Ministry. The Clause resulted in massive sackings in the industry and thus many German and Austrian Jews had left for Hollywood. The ban even caused some non-Jewish Germans to leave. The likes of Detlef Sierck, a melodrama director, (e.g. Final Chord, 1936), left for the US in 1937, changed his name to Douglas Sirk and went on to direct classics such as All that Heaven Allows in 1955.[13] On the 30th of June 1933 the Aryan Clause was established which forbid Jews from working in the film industry. This, of course, created US hostility towards Germany, especially among the Jewish population there. It also meant that Germany lost a huge amount of Jewish talent in the industry.

Also, the censorship office tended to object to foreign films on ideological and racial grounds. In a short time, foreign distributors gave up trying to exhibit their films in Germany. This meant that many German artists with international reputations left Germany, which made German films, become even more parochial and nationalistic. In this sense, German films were not artistically up to standard for U.S. audiences.

Goebbels recognised that feature films needed to be made of the topmost artistic value, so that foreign countries would not reject them for long. It was decided that a Film Credit Bank (Filmkreditbank) would provide sufficient funding for artistically valuable features which would raise foreign interest and awareness of German cinema.  The established of a film industry bank was again one of the strategies summoned for by the SPIO, and would further Nazi control of what was produced in the industry, through the financing and film-making stages. [14]

First announced on 1 June 1933 by the Film Kurier film trade magazine, it had initial capital of 200,000 RM provided by Reichskreditgesellschaft, the Dresdener Bank, the Deutsche Bank, and the Commerz-und Privatbank.[15] Reserves agreed to by the banks were 10 million RM.[16]  All loans from the Filmkreditbank were channelled through the Reich Film Chamber (consolidation).

A private, limited liability company, it would function like a normal commercial bank, but was not expected to make large profits.[17]As a provider of credit and help for the crisis ridden film industry, it would stimulate independent film production, as lending would be at highly competitive rates. The government would not be directly involved in financing but would appoint supporters to decisive positions in the supervisory board that would carry out their wishes. It was in this way that they controlled the operation.

Above all else, it would ensure Third Reich popularity among the film industry. Such help from the government (being the first of its kind) was welcomed from all sides of the film industry. It was to be the first step in the road of the government’s rising control of the film industry, which saw its peak in nationalisation in 1942, and ended when the war was lost in 1945.

Apart from financing, Filmkreditbank would oversee the change of content in film to keep it in line with the beliefs of the new regime.

A loan applying production firm had to deliver a script to the office of the Filmkreditbank for evaluation, censorship and consultations before script approval. This, of course, was closely linked to the RMVP, which allowed the government to know everything about every film sponsored and oversee the whole production process from start to finish (this again was fundamentally a recommendation of the SPIO master plan). The Filmkreditbank would not limit the role of conventional banks, but safeguard their investments. No bank wanted to finance a film doomed to be banned by the censors at a later stage.

As Welch and Vande Winkel argue the “Film Credit Bank was to create the beginnings of the National Socialists’ disastrous film policy and to result in the dependence of the private film producers on the Nazi State.”[18] As specified, it was first established to help stimulate independent production, but by 1936 it was financing over 73 per cent of all German features, and dealt almost entirely with distributors who guaranteed nationwide showings.[19] Filmkreditbank lending policies tended to favour the big four companies- Ufa, Tobis, Bavaria and Terra- and so encouraged the further rationalisation of the film industry. Thus, smaller company shares in the market further decreased due to this streamlining. In turn, it created a continually rising dependence on the state for film financing, which sequentially destroyed independent creativity (further realised with the ban of criticism).

By 1937 Goebbels was taking the first steps that would place the Film Industry under State control. While film attendance had been increasing steadily, Dr Fritz Scheuermann (Reich Film Chamber) warned Goebbels that production expenditure had increased by 50% since 1933. The record year of 1938 saw nearly 440 million tickets sold. But, the cost of productions had more than doubled from RM 250,000 in 1933 to RM 537,000 in 1937.[20] In 1937, Ufa losses were nearly RM 15 million. It was the perfect opportunity for the government, through state intervention, to sweep into a more dominant position. This was the start of the gradual nationalisation of the GFI. It would include the task of clearing up economic problems and disguising them under a private company.

On 18 March 1937 the government bought a controlling interest in Ufa (72.6%) represented by Max Winkler of Cautio Treuhandsgesellschaft.[21] Cautio would ultimately obtain the Ufa, Tobis, Terra, and Bavaria studios for the Reich government. Winkler was asked to buy majority holdings on all the major film firms with funds supplied by the government. Between 1936 and 1939, firms changed from public to private limited liability companies. Winkler administered their finances both as a majority shareholder and as a government trustee through Cautio. They kept their names (to hide this from the public) but were all now actively involved in the new alliance between the state and German cinema.

Goebbels was able to claim that the government takeover had been motivated by purely artistic (not commercial) reasons. Winkler had convinced Goebbels that the best way to achieve ideologically committed films was not to force the FI to become National Socialists, but to guarantee them financial stability. In other words, money can buy the government whatever it wants. So, both the production and distribution sectors would be drawn into the Nazi system without even realizing they were becoming increasingly political instruments of the Third Reich. The companies were referred to as staatsmittelbar (indirectly state controlled) rather than state owned.[22]

Film companies became directly answerable to Cautio, who were directly answerable to the Propaganda Ministry, for which it held the shares in trust. The Propaganda Ministry, to some extent was answerable to the Finance Ministry, which had originally supplied the funds for the whole operation. And so, the German Film Industry was rationalised which paved the way for the eventual nationalisation in 1942.

 

 

 

Censorship

On 28 March 1933 Goebbels talked to leading representatives of the German Film Industry at the Berlin Hotel Kaiserhof about the crisis of the German cinema, and called for radical reforms. He said that German cinema would have to become more committed to National Socialism in the future, and that “art is only possible when it is rooted in the National Socialist soil”.[23] Goebbels loved cinema and described himself as “a passionate lover of cinematic art.” He warned German filmmakers that they had false, oppositional conception of National Socialism that needed to change. [24] No doubt the extensive measures that would boost the economy of the film industry, and financing regulations, helped any opposition to smoothly turn into avid tolerance of National Socialism. Goebbels wanted more than just propaganda in films.

On 9 Oct 1933 Goebbels stated that “We National Socialists have no great desire to watch Storm Troopers march on stages or cinema screens. They belong on the street.”[25] On 1 March 1934 the New Reich Cinema Law (Lichtspielgesetz) came into effect to replace the old one from 12 May 1920. It clearly spelled out the new principles of film censorship. In all matters, the Propaganda Ministry had the right of intervention.

Before public screenings, an official certification from the Film Censorship Board was a requirement. All films had to be submitted, whether public or private screenings. Film advertising was also to be censored. There was an increase in the number of provisions by which the Censorship office in Berlin (Filmprüfstelle) could ban a film. Anything considered critical of National Socialism ‘from aesthetic styles to moral sensibilities’ could be prohibited, banned and confiscated.[26]

The new innovation of a Reich Film Advisor (Reichsfilmdramaturg) came into effect which replaced the previous post-production censorship. This saw a RMVP official take on a pre-censor position where any changes suggested were binding to the further production of a film. This was to “prevent the presentation of contents that run counter to the spirit of the times.”[27] As a representative of the RMVP, the dramaturg could overstep censorship ordered by the Censorship Office (Prüfstelle) in Berlin. Will Krause was the first instituted Reichsfilmdramaturg.

The close involvement of the Propaganda Ministry at the pre-production stage limited the economic risks for the studios while extending ministerial control to all stages of production. Even still, the number of films that were actually banned remained small. It was mainly higher in number in the 1940’s probably due to the war and the government wanting to keep the public in high spirits with certain genres that benefited escapism so as not to demoralize wartime audiences.

On 28 June 1935 the Second Reich Cinema Law Amendment saw the consolidation of Goebbels position which gave him extra powers to ban, without any reference to the Censorship Office, any film if he felt that it was in the public’s interest.

A greatly enlarged system of film predicates (prädikate) awarded by the RMVP Prüfstelle came into effect at this time and made the industry more politicised. Predicates during all or part of 1933-1945 were awarded as follows:

  • Politically valuable
  • Politically especially valuable
  • Artistically valuable
  • Artistically especially valuable
  • Politically and artistically especially valuable (the highest distinction)
  • Valuable for youth
  • Nationally valuable
  • Film of the nation
  • Commendable

The predicate system was essentially a form of negative taxation. The highest distinction awarded meant a film was completely exempt from tax. A lower distinction was tax reduced proportionate to their value.  A distinction came with elaborate publicity and helped to establish certain audience expectations about the film. Almost one third of all feature films received distinctions or ratings of some sort, which is an indication of the Ministry’s efforts to promote specific genre subjects.  ‘Politically valuable’ clearly reflected the aims of the NSDAP (for example, the documentary Triumph des Willen, 1940). After 1938 no exhibitor was allowed to refuse to show a politically valuable film if offered one.  ‘Artistically valuable’ were meant to be understood in the sense of cultural propaganda and were given to prestige films and those reserved for export. ‘Film of the Nation’ and ‘Valuable for Youth’ didn’t carry any tax relief but greatly enhanced a film’s status and made it more likely to be selected for showing in schools and Nazi youth organisations.

‘Film of the Nation’ was only awarded four times.[28] All of these were staatsauftragsfilme (state commissioned films) which were big budget with a clear propaganda intention commissioned by the Propaganda Ministry to promote key concepts of Nazi ideology in narrative form.[29]

By such measures, the predicate system was fundamentally an attempt to create a new positive censorship where the state ‘encouraged’ what they believed to be good films instead of ‘discouraging’ bad films. Often, a film only passed the censorship office one or two days before its premiere.  This suggests that within a short period of time, legal censorship became a mere formality, the real censorship being done elsewhere at an earlier stage in the process of the film’s production.[30]

Censorship was re-organised to fit the principles of the NSDAP. So, then Goebbels embarked on his new project-nationalisation.

 

Ban on Criticism

On 27 November 1935 all film criticism was banned by Goebbels. From then on critics had to act as servants (Kunstdiener) rather than judges (Kunstrichter) of art.[31]

Through this, a film deemed important by the RMVP was introduced to the public before its exhibition by progress reports on film production. The first performance of the film would be accompanied by an extravagant illustrated report and then a few days later, by a favourable analysis which would place the film within its political context. The press introduced the public to films, explained them, and fitted the events of the film into a topical context. Even for a bad film, a positive review had to be found and ‘political value’ films were praised on principle. The press were guided in the formation of definitions and the use of language by directives from the RMVP, enabling it to present a common approach in its film reviews.[32]

Essentially, whatever the Nazis approved would have to be approved of by the German people also. So, there was no room for objective media in this concern.

Conclusion

Table 1: Cinema and Admissions in the Third Reich.[33]

Year

Number of Cinemas

Admissions (Millions)

1933

5,071

245

1934

4,889

259

1935

4,782

303

1936

5,259

362

1937

5,302

396

1938

5,446

442

1939

6,923

624

1940

7,018

834

1941

7,043

892

1942

7,042

1,062

1943

6,561

1,116

1944

6,484

1,101

 

As outlined, the German Film Industry was quickly and effectively re-organised when the Nazis came to power in 1933. Re-organisation resulted in a rationalisation of the industry, so it could respond efficiently to the demands of the RMVP. In practice this meant the simplifying of film financing, and the strict control over the content of feature films.  Essentially the mass co-ordination of the film industry gave the government mass control over what it produced.  

Looking at Table 1, it is clear that the Nazis rehabilitated the German Film Industry, which became the largest film industry in Europe in the years to come. It would become the fourth largest industry in Nazi Germany. Contrary to what many may assume, the Nazi Film Industry was not a facility for just political propaganda. It was, of course, firmly mixed with National Socialist ideology, but enabled a growing awareness of the need for artistically worthy produced films, so long as they did not contend with the Nazi regime.

 

Bibliography

 

Brockman, Stephen, A Critical History of German Film (Rochester, N.Y.: Camden House, 2010)

Hake, Sabine, German National Cinema (London; New York: Routledge, 2002)

Hull, David Stewart, “Forbidden Fruit: The Harvest of the German Cinema, 1939-1945,” Film Quarterly, Vol.  14, No. 4 (1961), pp. 16-30.

Mühl-Benninghaus, Wolfgang, “The German Film Credit Bank, Inc.: Film Financing during the First Years of National-Socialist Rule in Germany,” Film History, Vol. 3 (1989), pp.317-332.

Petley, Julian, ”Film Policy in the Third Reich”, eds. ,Tim Bergfelde, Erica Carter, and Deniz Göktürk, The German Cinema Book (London: BFI Pub., 2002)

Philips, M.S, “Nazi Control of the German Film Industry,” Journal of European Studies, Vol. 1 (1971), pp. 37-68.

Rentschler, Eric, The Ministry of Illusion: Nazi Cinema and its Afterlife (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996)

Welch, David and Vande Winkel, Roel. “Europe’s New Hollywood? The German Film Industry Under Nazi Rule, 1933-45”, in Cinema and the Swastika: The International Expansion of Third Reich Cinema, eds. Welch, David and Vande Winkel, Roel (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007)


[1]See Sabine Hake, German National Cinema (London; New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 59.David Stowart Hull says the history of the Nazi German Film Industry fits nicely into two parts: 1933-1939 and 1939-1945. See David Stewart Hull, Forbidden Fruit: The Harvest of the German Cinema, 1939-1945, Film Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 4 (summer, 1961) pp.16-30 University of California Press, this p 17.

[2]The first official film produced by the NSDAP was footage of the 1927 Nuremberg Rally. From this year onwards, every NSDAP rally was filmed. Hitler and Goebbels were aware of a films ability to muster up emotions and captivate an audience. Goebbels himself was a huge cinema fan.

[3] Petley, Julian, Film Policy in the Third Reich, eds. Tim Bergfelder, Erica Carter, and Deniz Göktürk, The German Cinema Book (London: BFI Pub., 2002), p. 173.

[4] Welch, David and Vande Winkel, Roel, “Europe’s New Hollywood? The German Film Industry Under Nazi Rule, 1933-45, in Cinema and the Swastika” in The International Expansion of Third Reich Cinema, eds. Roel Vande Winkel and David Welch, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 7.

[5] Welch and Vande Winkel, “Europe’s New Hollywood?”, p. 7.

[6] Petley, “Film Policy in the Third Reich,” p. 173. Also, see Welch and Vande Winkel, “Europe’s New Hollywood,” p. 8.

[7] Hugenberg, a media magnate, was the head of the German Nationalist People’s Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei- DNVP) and was a highly conservative Nazi sympathiser.

[8] Petley, “Film Policy in the Third Reich,” p. 174.

 

[9] Rentschler, Eric, The Ministry of Illusion: Nazi Cinema and its Afterlife (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 229.

[10] Petley, “Film Policy in the Third Reich,” p. 173.

[11] Hans Hinkel became a member of the NSDAP in October 1921 at Munich University. From 1924-1925 he was chief editor of the Oberbayerishe Tageszeitung. He then edited and published a number of small NSDAP newspapers. In 1928 he joined the Strasser brothers Kampfverlag in Berlin. As a leading member of the Reichsleitung des Kampfbunds für deutsche Kultur he was known to have an interest in both theatre and film. After 1934 he had hoped to be made Intendant of the Prussian Theatre, but this was given to Goering. So Hinkel created his own department to be responsible for the supervision of Jewish cultural activity and eventually got his office incorporated in the Reich Culture Chamber. By the end of 1935 Goebbels realized his potential and appointed him the general secretary of the Reich Culture Chamber.  For further reading on Hans Hinkel, please see M.S. Philips, “Nazi Control of the German Film Industry,” in Journal of European Studies, Vol. 1, (1971) pp. 37-68, this p. 47.

[12] Still, in 1939, 85 of the 272 foreign films shown in the US were produced by German or Austrian companies. They found small audiences in the cities and states of America with a strong German speaking immigrant population. The activities of various anti-Nazi groups prevented this by increasing public awareness of the situation in Europe. There were anti-Nazi films produced involving exiled actors and directors. See Sabine Hake, German National Cinema (London; New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 64.

[13] Brockmann, Stephen, A Critical History of German Film (Rochester, N.Y.: Camden House, 2010), p.133.

[14] In 1933 the Filmkreditbank will help to finance 22 shorts and features, in 1934 49 features, in 1935 65 features, in 1936 82 features (over 70 per cent of German films produced). See Rentschler, Eric, The Ministry of Illusion: Nazi Cinema and its Afterlife (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 228.

[15] Film Kurier, 1 April 1933 cited in Wolfgang Mühl- Benninghaus, “The German Film Credit Bank, Inc.: Film Financing during the First Years of National-Socialist Rule in Germany,” in Film History, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1989), p. 323.

[16] Film Kurier, 1 April 1933 cited in Wolfgang Mühl- Benninghaus, “The German Film Credit Bank, Inc.: Film Financing during the First Years of National-Socialist Rule in Germany,” in Film History, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1989), p. 323

[17] Welch and Vande Winkel, “Europe’s New Hollywood?,” p. 9.

[18] Welch, and Vande Winkel, “Europe’s New Hollywood?,” p. 9.

[19] Welch, and Vande Winkel, “Europe’s New Hollywood?,” p. 10, citing Bundesarchiv (Barch), R55/484, Akten des Reichsministeriums für Volksäfklarung und Propaganda, Filmkreditbankbilanz, 1943.

[20] Hake, German National Cinema, p. 65.

[21] Cautio Treuhandgessellschaft was a trust company that the government had given vast sums of money to so they could set up an ‘invisible empire’ of newspapers on their behalf.

[22] Welch, Vande Winkel, “Europe’s New Hollywood?,” p. 19.

 

[23] Brockmann, Stephen, A Critical History of German Film (Rochester, N.Y.: Camden House, 2010), p.135.

[24] Brockmann, A Critical History of German Film, p.133. See Dr. Goebbels speech at the Kaiserhof on March 28,1933 translated by W. Garmer in German Essays on Film, eds. Richard W. McCormick and Alison Guenther-Pal (New York and London: Continuum, 2004), 153-58, here 154.

[25] Rentschler, Eric, The Ministry of Illusion: Nazi Cinema and its Afterlife (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 229.

[26] Hake, German National Cinema, p. 62.

[27] Rentschler, The Ministry of Illusion, p. 231.

[28] Ohm Krüger (1941), Heimkehr (Homecoming) 1941, Der Grosse König (The Great King) 1942, and Die Entlassung (The Dismissal) 1942. See Sabine Hake, German National Cinema (London; New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 63.

[29] Hake, German National Cinema, p. 63.

[30] Welch and Vande Winkel, “Europe’s New Hollywood?,” p. 14.

[31] Rentschler, The Ministry of Illusion, p. 237.

[32] Welch, Vande Winkel, “Europe’s New Hollywood?,” p. 14.

[33] Rentschler, “The Ministry of Illusion,” p. 13 citing Hans Helmult Prinzler, Chronik des deutschen Films 1895-1994 (Stuttgart/Weimar: Metzler, 1995).

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